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WAYNE R. LAFAVE: SEARCH &
SEIZURE COMMENTATOR
AT WORK AND PLAY
Jerold H. Israel*
Yale Kamisar**
Starting in 1969,1 we have had the honor and pleasure of co-author-
ing a goodly number of casebooks, texts, treatises, pocket parts, and an-
nual supplements (more than twenty) with Wayne LaFave.2 On each
occasion we have been impressed by the quality of his mind and the judi-
ciousness of his temperament, and impressed as well (and sometimes
amazed) by his speed and efficiency.
Every time we have worked on a joint project, Wayne has completed
his assigned portions of the work first. Indeed, one time, before we could
get around to producing an outline of a book we had talked about,
Wayne finished the entire book by himself.
In the early and middle 1970s, the three of us had talked about pub-
lishing a casebook on substantive criminal law. Several times Wayne de-
clared he was "ready to go" on that book, but each time we begged off,
claiming that other commitments prevented us from turning our atten-
tion to that project. After a while Wayne stopped nagging us about the
matter. Then one day we each received a package in the mail from West
Publishing Co.-a package containing LaFave's new casebook on sub-
stantive criminal law.'
In the early and middle 1980s the three of us talked about another
possible joint project-preparing teaching materials for a short introduc-
* Alene & Allan F. Smith Professor of Law. University of Michigan and Ed Rood Eminent
Scholar, University of Florida. B.B.A., Case Western Reserve University; LL.B. 1959, Yale University.
** Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B.
1950, New York University; LL.B. 1954, Columbia University; LL.D. 1978, John Jay College of Crim-
inal Justice (CUNY); LLD. 1979, University of Puget Sound.
1. LIVINGSTON HALL, YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, MOD-
ERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS & QUESTIONS (3d ed. 1969).
2. See, e.g., JEROLD H. ISRAEL & WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUT-
SHELL: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (4th ed. 1988); JEROLD H. ISRAEL, YALE KAMISAR &
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION (1988) (revised annually);
YALE KAMISAR, WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
CASES, COMMENTS & QUESTIONS (7th ed. 1990); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE (1984) (three-volume treatise); WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1992) (one-volume text).
3. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS & QUESTIONS (1St
ed. 1978, 2d ed. 1988).
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tory course on criminal procedure, a book suitable for undergraduate
criminal justice and political science courses as well as for combined
criminal law/criminal procedure first-year law courses. Once again, we
were slow getting around to this project. Then, in a January 1988 letter
to us, Wayne expressed the hope that "given the fact that we have talked
about doing this book for a number of years now.. . we could put aside
other matters and deliver the manuscript to West within the next six
months." This time, Wayne did get our full attention. We were not go-
ing to be "preempted" a second time.4 We had come to realize that
Wayne spoke softly but carried a big word processor (at least a very fast
one).
Although we are proud of the many volumes we have co-authored
with Wayne, we readily admit that his most notable achievement-and a
great achievement indeed-is a work he produced "solo"-his monu-
mental treatise on search and seizure.5
"For most of my life in academe," Wayne once said, "I have staked
out as my favorite intellectual sandbox the fourth amendment-that is,
the law governing constitutional limitations upon search and seizure."'
That's a bit like saying John Henry Wigmore's "favorite intellectual
sandbox" was the law of evidence.7
Wayne always likes to state the arguments against his position fairly
and succinctly. Thus, he recalls that one of his students once asked him:
"If [the Fourth Amendment] is so damn important, how come it's only
fourth?"8 Wayne responded: "[T]he fourth amendment really isn't
fourth, and I take as my authority Justice Felix Frankfurter, who de-
clared that the fourth amendment occupies 'a place second to none in the
Bill of Rights.'... To any free speech buffs in the crowd, my apologies."9
4. The book was published later that year. See JEROLD H. ISRAEL, YALE KAMISAR &
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND THE CONSTITUTION: LEADING SUPREME
COURT CASES AND INTRODUCTORY TEXT (1988) (revised annually).
5. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
(2d ed. 1987). The first edition of this treatise consisted of three volumes; the second edition, as a
treatise on this subject should, was expanded to four volumes.
6. Wayne R. LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: On Allen's "Process of 'Factualization'in
the Search and Seizure Cases," 85 MICH. L. REV. 427, 429 (1986).
7. Wigmore is probably the most cited author of all time, but U.S. Supreme Court citations to
LaFave compare favorably with those to Wigmore-when one considers that Wigmore had a sixty-
one-year head start. A computer check reveals that, starting in 1905, the Supreme Court has quoted
or cited Wigmore in 296 cases and that, starting in 1966, it has quoted or cited LaFave in 91 cases.
Thus, LaFave's rate of citations per year is about the same as Wigmore's.
8. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World. On Drawing "Bright
Lines" and "Good Faith", 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 308 (1982).
9. Id. at 309 (quoting from Justice Frankfurter's opinion in Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 157 (1947)); see also Wayne R. LaFave, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta Principiis in Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 291 (1986) [hereinafter The Forgotten Motto]:
[W]hether you can stomach this Fourth-is-first anteriority or instead are a literalist who believes
the Fourth is only fourth, I hope you will concede that the fourth amendment's protections are
not at all trivial and that, as no less a personage than Erwin Griswold once put it, they largely
determine "the kind of society in which we live."
Id. at 292.
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"The bare words" chosen by the framers of the Fourth Amendment,
Wayne is quick to concede, "do not carry us very far."'" But Wayne has
done his best (and his best is very good indeed) to do something about
that. Indeed, it would be fair to say nobody in American history has
done more. As Wayne recently noted, putting aside the many articles he
has published on the subject and counting only his four-volume treatise,
he has written "well over twenty-five thousand words for each of the
fifty-four words in the ... Amendment.""
How can Wayne LaFave write so much so well? Why has he been
so influential? He has great powers of analysis, and he writes quickly,
crisply and easily (at least he is easy to read). But so do others. His
secret may be that he always keeps a certain distance from the never-
ending developments and changes in search and seizure law that he never
ceases to evaluate and to explain.
Wayne never becomes too involved or intense or emotive; he always
keeps his balance-and his sense of humor. He turns out an enormous
amount of insightful and illuminating commentary-he is an awesome
"writing machine"-but he is also a warm-blooded human being. He
must get a great sense of satisfaction from his work, but he also has a
good deal of fun along the way-and he is funny.12
When, in New York v. Belton, 3 the Court adopted a "bright-line"
rule that significantly broadened the "search incident to arrest" excep-
tion in automobile settings, a development that Wayne did not applaud,
the majority quoted at some length from a LaFave article underscoring
the need to express search and seizure doctrine "in terms that are readily
applicable by the police." 4 Shortly thereafter, Wayne commented:
The Court has-quite untentionally [sic], I am sure-placed me
in a most awkward position. Every red-blooded American boy
hopes to grow up and some day be quoted by the United States
Supreme Court, and even those of us with tired blood take some
pleasure in such recognition. How, then, can I possibly do anything
less than express my unbounded enthusiasm for the Court's decision
in Belton? But on the other hand, who ever heard of a law profes-
sor, anywhere or anytime, doing something like that? "Nice job,
Supreme Court!" What kind of speech, or what kind of a law review
article would that make? Certainly not one which is likely to get a
person in my profession a moment's notice, to say nothing of tenure
10. LaFave, supra note 8, at 309.
11. Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment: A Bicentennial "Checkup", 26 VAL. U.L.
REV. 223, 224 (1991).
12. As a humorist, he is perhaps at his best in the "one-liners" that often come at the end of his
personal notes on our continuing projects, but because those are not for publication (though always
fit for public consumption), we will limit our illustrations (somewhat reluctantly) to his published
comments.
13. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
14. Id. at 458 (quoting from Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Stan-
dardized Procedures" The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 127, 141).
No. 2]
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.... Thus, true to my spots, I shall proceed with a criticism of the
Belton decision. For those of you offended by such acerbity, I
would only note that I am by no means sure that the Court has
treated me any more kindly. I could not help but recall in this con-
text the late Robert Benchley's comment that "the surest way to
make a monkey of a man is to quote him." 5
In a notable 1984 case, United States v. Leon,6 the Burger Court
culminated its "cost-benefit" or "balancing" approach to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule by adopting a so-called good faith (actu-
ally, a "reasonable mistake") exception to the rule (at least in search-
warrant cases). As he had made plain two years earlier, this was not a
development awaited eagerly by Wayne:
To admit, at criminal trials, evidence supposedly obtained by the
police in an innocent and relatively slight failure to toe the fourth
amendment line, necessitating revision of the old quip that "close
only counts in horseshoes and grenades" to include "and also in
search and seizure," seems to me an unwise step to take. Even put-
ting aside the concern which some have expressed that such a re-
casting of the exclusionary rule would be unfaithful to the other
reasons underlying the rule, I am convinced that in the long run a
"good faith" exception would produce many unfortunate conse-
quences and would do a disservice to even the deterrence objective.
The acclaimed legal philosopher Woody Allen once wrote: "The
lion and the calf shall lie down together, but the calf won't get much
sleep." The chances of the deterrence objective under such a refor-
mulated exclusionary rule, it seems to me, are about those of Allen's
calf. '"
Shortly after accepting an invitation to give a talk on the Fourth
Amendment at the University of Arizona College of Law in the fall of
1986, a talk celebrating the bicentennial of the U.S. Constitution, Wayne
had second thoughts. For a colleague of his insisted that Wayne had
selected the wrong subject, "as that youngster the fourth amendment has
only been around since 1791." ' 8 As Wayne tells the story:
The irrefragability of [my colleague's] objection, I must confess, was
such that I seriously contemplated shifting to some other topic hav-
ing legitimate bicentennial credentials (such as: Is the "necessary
and proper" clause more necessary than proper, or vice-versa?). But
my infatuation with the fourth amendment proved to be too intense,
so the fourth amendment it is!
But that was only the beginning of my troubles. A bicentennial
speech, it seems to me, ought to take the long view of things; it
15. LaFave, supra note 8, at 325 (citations omitted).
16. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
17. LaFave, supra note 8, at 340-41 (citations omitted); see also Wayne R. LaFave, "The Se-
ductive Call of Expediency': United States v. Leon, Its Rationale and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REV. 895.
18. The Forgotten Motto, supra note 9, at 292.
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should look at some trend in our constitutional jurisprudence as it
has developed over this span of 200 years. But when I looked back
into the earlier Supreme Court decisions what did I find concerning
the fourth amendment? Nothing! Absolutely nothing-zip, cipher,
zero, aught, nil, or however you want to put it. To ensure that this
was not just an instance of my WESTLAW terminal being unable to
penetrate the veil of antiquity, I checked with fourth amendment
historian Jacob Landynski, who informs that the fourth amendment
"remained for almost a century largely unexplored territory." (This
must be what Attorney General Meese means by the "good old
days.")1 9
Wayne did deliver a bicentennial speech on the Fourth Amendment
in 1986, in the course of which he had a few unkind words to say about
California v. Ciraolo,2° a case that gave the landmark decision of Katz v.
United States2" a very narrow reading-so much so, Wayne remarked,
that "[w]ere it not for the anticipated groans, I would be inclined to say
that Katz has gone to the dogs."22 Wayne described the Ciraolo facts as
follows:
Santa Clara police received an anonymous tip that marijuana was
growing in respondent's backyard. An effort at ground-level surveil-
lance went for naught, as respondent had decided to conceal his gar-
dening and other curtilage-based deportment from passersby with a
solid 6-foot outer fence and 10-foot inner fence. Undaunted, the of-
ficer assigned to this investigation then secured a private plane and
flew over respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet. He and the
officer with him, both trained in marijuana identification, readily
identified in a 15 by 25 foot plot in respondent's backyard marijuana
plants growing 8 to 10 feet high. (Those sound like exceptionally
healthy plants to me, which explains why, when I first read this
case, my mind's eye conjured up the grinning visage of actor James
Whitmore, as in the ubiquitous TV commercials, extolling Stem's
Plant Food and displaying the bounteous harvest of that
fecundator.) 23
In the course of his opinion for the Court holding that the aerial
surveillance of defendant's fenced-in backyard was not a "search" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Chief Justice Burger observed
that although "[i]t can reasonably be assumed that the 10-foot fence was
placed to conceal the marijuana crop from at least street-level views[,]
a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the eyes of a citizen
19. Id.
20. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
21. 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (declaring that in ascertaining whether a "search" has taken place the
question is not whether the police invaded a "constitutionally protected area," but whether they
infringed upon a "constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy").
22. The Forgotten Motto, supra note 9, at 297.
23. Id. at 295-96.
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or a policeman perched on the top of a truck or a two-level bus."24 Thus,
"[w]hether [defendant] thereby manifested a subjective expectation of
privacy from all observations of his backyard, or whether instead he
manifested merely a hope that no one would observe his unlawful gar-
dening pursuits, is not entirely clear under the circumstances."25 This
led Wayne to comment:
The unfortunate implication of [the Chief Justice's remarks] is that a
defendant cannot even get by the first Katz hurdle [did he manifest a
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged sur-
veillance?] unless he has taken steps to ensure against all conceivable
efforts at scrutiny; it is not enough (as the dissenters in Ciraolo put
it) that "he had taken steps to shield those activities from the view of
passersby." Actually, it is worse than that; what the majority seems
to be saying is that one cannot have an expectation of privacy unless
safeguards have been put in place that ensure against even purely
hypothetical means of intrusion upon privacy. The Chief Justice's
reference to double-decker buses suggests that his travels to London
have had a profound effect upon his outlook, but it does not reflect
knowledge of the state of affairs in Santa Clara. The truth of the
matter is that there are no double-decker buses in that community.26
As Ciraolo and a number of other cases illustrate,27 in the 1970s and
1980s the Court took a grudging view of what constitutes a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Two years ago it took a
similarly narrow view of what amounts to a "seizure." It did so in two
important cases: Florida v. Bostick28 (involving an "encounter" between
drug interdiction police and a passenger aboard an interstate bus during
a scheduled intermediate stop) and California v. Hodari (involving the
police chase of a youth who fled at the sight of the officers).29
In Hodari, a group of youths in a high-crime area "apparently pan-
icked and took flight" on spotting an approaching police car. One of the
officers left the car to give chase. He took a circuitous route that brought
him face to face with Hodari. Looking behind as he ran, Hodari did not
see the officer until the latter was almost upon him, whereupon Hodari
tossed away a small rock, which proved to be crack cocaine. A moment
later, the officer tackled Hodari and subdued him.
The California Court of Appeal held that Hodari had been "seized"
when he saw the officer running toward him. Because the state conceded
24. 476 U.S. at 211.
25. Id. at 211-12.
26. The Forgotten Motto, supra note 9, at 298 (citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (police examination, for evidence of
crime, of contents of opaque sealed plastic trash bags left for collection not a "search"); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (expansively reading the "open fields" exception to Fourth
Amendment restraints); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (government's use of a "pen regis-
ter," a device that records all numbers dialed from a given phone and the times the numbers were
dialed, not a "search").
28. 111 S. Ct. 2382 (1991).
29. 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991).
[Vol. 1993
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that the officer lacked the "reasonable suspicion" required to "stop" or to
."seize" Hodari, it ruled that the evidence of the cocaine had to be sup-
pressed as the fruit of the antecedent illegal "seizure." But a seven to
two majority, per Justice Scalia, held that no "seizure" had occurred un-
til the officer had tackled Hodari.
Assuming that the officer's pursuit did constitute a "show of author-
ity" calling upon Hodari to halt, a "seizure" does not take place, the
Court told us, when the subject of the police command does not submit.
Because Hodari did not comply with the police injunction to halt, assum-
ing that the confrontation with the pursuing officer was the equivalent of
such an injunction, he was not "seized" until he was actually subdued.
At issue in Bostick was the constitutionality of a police practice
often called "working the buses"-a new and increasingly common tactic
in the "war on drugs."
Bostick argued that the cramped confines of a bus-where one of-
ficer towers over a seated passenger and the same officer and/or another
at least partially blocks the narrow aisle, requiring the passenger to try to
squeeze past him if he wants to move away rendered the suspicionless
police-citizen bus encounter an illegal "seizure."30 The majority re-
sponded that this was only "one relevant factor that should be consid-
ered in evaluating whether a passenger's consent is voluntary," not a
basis for a per se rule prohibiting the police from randomly boarding
buses as a means of drug interdiction.31
The Hodari and Bostick cases moved LaFave to write a short essay
on "fat cops," a group of officers who, until now at least, have been
neither highly prized nor heavily recruited: 32
The conventional wisdom ... is that police should not be fat.
Rather, law enforcement officers should be slim, trim, and of ath-
letic build-adequately prepared for the physical demands placed
upon them in the routine performance of their challenging
duties....
It just may be, however, that all this is about to change. The
law enforcement administrator of the 1990s may be moved to aban-
don the conventional wisdom in favor of Caesar's exhortation.
30. A majority of the Court has endorsed the view, first advanced by Justice Stewart in United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557 (1980), that no "seizure" occurs when drug agents approach
a person walking through an airport concourse, identify themselves, and ask to see her airline ticket
and identification. See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.2 (h) (2d ed.
1987).
31. See Ill S. Ct. at 2387.
32. See, e.g., David A. Kaplan & Todd Barrett, The Finest or the Fattest? Chicago Cops Face a
Crackdown on Flab, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 16, 1991, at 58. According to the supervisor of a mandatory
fitness program for police officers, "a belly gets in the way on the job. 'I don't want a fat cop coming
to my house when there's an intruder,' he says. 'Then you've got a double problem.'" Id. Adds the
head of a Chicago Police watchdog group, "complaints of excessive force correlate to officer fitness.
'If police were in shape, they wouldn't have to bully people around.' " He continues by "say[ing] the
ballooning of the blue uniforms leads to taunting and a poor public image. At a recent march,....
demonstrators quickly picked up the chant 'Bad cop, no more doughnuts.' " Id.
No. 2]
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["Let me have men about me that are fat."] Obese police (or, if you
prefer, corpulent cops) might well become especially valued by their
departments for their unique law enforcement talents....
The message which Hodari D. sends to the law enforcement
community is clear: when police are acting merely on a hunch, a
slow chase is better than a fast one, for if the cop in that case had
caught up with the youth and grabbed him by the scruff of the neck
before the cocaine was ditched, there would have been an illegal
seizure requiring suppression of the subsequently discovered drugs.
In short,festina lente is the order of the day, for it avoids a constitu-
tional intrusion and thus ensures admissibility of the abandoned
drugs. Equally apparent is the fact that in flight cases of the Hodari
D. genre, the requisite degree of constabulary sluggishness can be
assured only if the pursuing flatfoot is irrefragably fubsy (to use the
onomatopoetic Briticism)....
[Bostick, no less than Hodari D.,] raises the stock of those law
enforcement officers of the endomorphic variety .... The Bostick
dissenters noted that officers engaged in [on-bus drug] . . . interdic-
tion efforts "typically plac[e] themselves in between the passenger
selected for an interview and the exit of the bus," and that in the
instant case "one officer stood in front of respondent's seat, partially
blocking the narrow aisle through which respondent would have
been required to pass to reach the exit of the bus." But such facts
were deemed unimportant by the majority . . . [because Bostick's
confinement] was nothing more than "the natural result of his deci-
sion to take the bus." Here again, the message to the law enforce-
ment community is quite clear: because the reasonable passenger's
perception of his freedom to depart is not determinative, there is no
disadvantage (and seemingly considerable advantage) in filling up
the narrow bus aisle with as much beef as can be mustered. In
short, the police sweep of buses is another drug detection activity
which is likely to be most successful when practiced by a polypha-
gian Falstaff.33
Such comments, of course, contain more than unadulterated humor.
Wayne himself has suggested what may be the inspiration for his humor.
In a commentary on United States v. Quartus, his fictitious "last" (and
heretofore unpublished) search and seizure decision of the Burger
Court,34 Wayne recalled an old Italian proverb: "Quel che pare burla,
ben sovent e' vero" (What seems a joke is very often true).35
Wayne, we are certain, will have a retirement more in name than in
33. Wayne R. LaFave, Pinguitudinous Police, Pachydermatous Prey: Whence Fourth Amend-
ment "Seizures"?, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 729, 730-32 (citations omitted). In a footnote to the title of
the article, written for the benefit of "those logomachists who pertinaciously anathematize polysyl-
labical sesquipedalianism as dysteleological," LaFave points out that the first four words of the title
may be roughly translated "fat cops, thick-skinned suspects." Id. at 729.
34. Wayne R. LaFave, A Fourth Amendment Fantasy: The Last (Heretofore Unpublished)
Search and Seizure Decision of the Burger Court, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 669.
35. Id. at 687.
[V/ol. 1993
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fact. We fully expect that the letters, telephone calls, and drafts will go
back and forth between Sanibel Island and Ann Arbor just as they have
gone back and forth between Champaign and Ann Arbor. Our only con-
cern is that, with Wayne having more time at his trusty word processor,
we will be falling even further behind on our share of what has always
been a wonderful long-running collaboration.
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